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Tuesday, March 01, 2011
Tuesday, February 01, 2011
The New Facebook
Need:
People are being overwhelmed by emails and marketing from different sites and companies about brand-related communications. You have the groupon and gilt-a-likes sending you discount and promotions every day. At the beginning people liked the idea and open and read every email. After a while people started to feel overwhelmed and aggregating sites started to become popular. Nevertheless there is no real solution today for the need of the people to communicate with their favorite brands.Description:
The idea here is to create an application or portal that can provide some solution to this need. It could be a facebook app or several facebook apps too. I am more incline that it has to be something different. Something not related to facebook.Potential:
The size of this opportunity is relatively large. If successful it can become the sole communication channel for brands, avoiding any other type of new media communication. Everything would be centralized in one location where consumer know they can find what they are looking for. From information, to product and services.Saturday, January 01, 2011
Changing Directions
Monday, December 06, 2010
U.S. Strains to Stop Arms Flow
American officials say they have been frustrated in their efforts to block Syria, Iran, North Korea and other countries from selling arms to militants.
I wonder if American officials are equally frustrated in their efforts to block the Southern U.S. states from selling arms to Mexican Drug cartels and militia.
Wouldn’t you think that is equally important?
Read More:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/world/07wikileaks-weapons.html?emc=na
Friday, October 01, 2010
La Siguiente Revolucion Industrial
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Which Countries Would Prefer to Raise Taxes or Cut Spending
Thursday, August 26, 2010
Evolution to Diversity
1. Respect Each Other
First step of the process is to have a respectful environment. Starting with the CEO or President, the company need to respect the differences between the members of the firm. Respect is the stepping stone to a better culture. In this step I see firms that have their own diverse organization or affiliated groups. Here is where firms try to build a pipeline of diverse candidates using their current respectful culture to attract them. In certain cases, the firm will try to 'train' that diverse candidate in the ways of the firm.
2. Understand the Differences
When members of the firm are respectful they can start the path of trying to understand their differences. This step is more difficult to accomplish that what it seems. If you believe your firm has accomplish this step you are probably in the first step. Understanding the differences require a change in processes. Your believe that 'your way is the right way' has to change. There is a reason why the world doesn't operate the same way. If you still believe that your part of the world has it all figured out that is probably a sign of not being there yet. Those processes that change are not only related to recruiting, they are probably 75-85% of all your processes including but not limited to recruiting, training, retaining, promotion, and operation.
3. Cherish the Differences
By knowing that there are different and sometime 'better' ways to operate an entity, your firm can take advantage of these differences. Firms that have changed their processes to become more diverse are now empowered to cherish their differences. Firms that have accomplish this step can use their culture to be more adaptive/responsive to/of client's need. Those firms would probably enjoy of more innovative ideas and have a better chance of solving the next generation of problems.
Friday, July 02, 2010
Hedging Sadness
I would definitively pay some money to hedge this sadness. I want something more sophisticated than just betting against my team. I want a full sadness coverage. Something that covers me in case my team is eliminated in the first round of the World Cup. Then something else for the second round until de final.
Wednesday, June 02, 2010
Lo que Necesita Colombia: Estabilidad, certeza jurídica y seriedad para los proyectos de inversión
[Quiero republicar un pedazo de esta entrevista con Michelle Bachelet –ex presidenta chilena— porque me pareció muy interesante. Para ver el texto completo por favor vayan al: http://www.semana.com/noticias-mundo/no-dejamos-trabajo-mercado/139502.aspx]
SEMANA: Colombia está en proceso de negociar tratados de libre comercio. ¿Qué beneficios le ha traído a Chile tener una economía abierta?
M.B: Chile es un país pequeño. Enfrentados al desafío de abrirnos al mundo, los gobiernos de la Concertación no dudamos que el camino era la apertura, la diversificación de las exportaciones, la promoción del libre comercio y el intercambio comercial con todo el mundo. Para eso implementamos políticas de fomentos de la competitividad que se traducen en el desarrollo de clusters o áreas productivas clave que están en condiciones de pararse de igual a igual con los productos y servicios de economías más grandes y desarrolladas. Hoy tenemos acceso -sin aranceles o con aranceles muy bajos- a un mercado mundial de 3.000 millones de consumidores, y nuestros productos están en Asia, Estados Unidos, Oceanía, China, América Latina, Europa, lo que ha implicado un salto enorme. Ahora estamos ampliando los acuerdos de libre comercio a las áreas de servicios y compras públicas.
SEMANA: Esa apertura suele ser muy buena para algunos sectores, pero no necesariamente para la generalidad. ¿Cómo hicieron para que la prosperidad de los empresarios y los inversionistas elevara el nivel de vida de tantos chilenos?
M.B: Permítame hacerle una precisión. Chile, durante los últimos 20 años, que son los de la Concertación, tuvo una definición estratégica en el empeño por mejorar la calidad de vida de los chilenos y chilenas. Me refiero a la educación, la salud, los salarios, las viviendas y los apoyos gubernamentales en subsidios a las familias. Es decir, no le dejamos el trabajo al mercado, al chorreo como dicen algunos, hubo aquí un rol del Estado con políticas públicas definidas y orientadas hacia el bienestar. Y dicho esto, le agrego que no es posible este bienestar sin el sector privado. Chile ofrece a los inversionistas chilenos y extranjeros estabilidad, certeza jurídica y seriedad para sus proyectos de inversión.
SEMANA: A pesar de su popularidad, usted no intentó cambiar las reglas para quedarse en el poder. ¿Qué piensa de la ola reeleccionista en América Latina?
M.B: Las leyes chilenas no permiten la reelección, y si alguien quiere hacerlo tiene que promover una reforma constitucional. Esta es una pregunta que me hicieron muchas veces. Y le voy a contestar lo que he dicho siempre: En la política hay que ser ético y estético. Y de ninguna manera hacer un traje a la medida del gobernante.
Monday, May 24, 2010
Cognitive vs Non-cognitive Skills
For an adult self-confidence is rooted in our self-image (who we are, what we have accomplished, how the world view us, etc). Those adults that have developed greater self-confidence are accustomed to focused on those metrics that put them on top. For example, athletes value stamina, speed or physical strength; bankers value networking and number skills; etc. A confident banker is not going to value "physical strength" above "networking skills" because it would go against it self-image of a successful professional.
For kids having a clear path to building self confidence is a little trickier as they have not yet developed an area of expertise. Kids do not know in what they are good so they do not know in what metrics to focus. Even worst, kids are easily convince that the metrics that matter are those imposed by a minority of kids, reinforced by our stereotypical movies and entertainment shows (e.g. beauty over intelligence). Most of the self-image comes from how parents and friends perceive them.
Here is were we need to change as a society. We need to start putting real effort to building self-confidence in kids by including this objective in the curriculum of schools. Self-confidence is not a substitute of knowledge but a necessary complement.
Thursday, April 08, 2010
Unfair Judgement Against Tiger Woods
Thursday, March 11, 2010
Donde Se Originará la Siguiente Crisis Mundial?
Es difícil concebir cual será la próxima crisis. ¿Sera una crisis inflacionaria dada las tasas de interés tan bajas? ¿Sera una crisis fiscal dada los niveles de endeudamiento de los diferentes países? ¿Sera una crisis civil dado un cambio en el nivel de violencia o corrupción?
Desde mi perspectiva las últimas crisis económicas relacionadas con el mercado accionario han comenzado con una percepción errónea de los valores de los activos involucrados. Esta percepción errónea viene de una combinación de factores como: complejidad del proceso de valoración o del instrumento, tamaño del mercado como tal, diferencias entre los jugadores dentro del sistema y falta de una norma clara.
Por ejemplo si pensamos en lo que le paso in el 2000 con las acciones relacionadas con internet. En este no existía una norma clara de cómo valorar estas empresas y los analistas pensaron que el mecanismo de valoración tenía que ser adaptado. Exista cierta complejidad dentro del proceso porque era un segmento nuevo para todos. Para que la burbuja se explote se necesito de otros catalizadores que hicieron despertarse a los inversionistas. Los inversionistas comenzaron a pensar más sobre el valor real de la acción y como estaban generando ellos mismo tanto dinero invirtiendo en este tipo de acciones.
Luego tenemos a Enron y las mismas características se reflejan en esta situación. 1. Complejidad en la estructura de negocios y productos, 2. Tamaño relevante como para llamar la atención un agente que ejecute una diligencia debida (en este caso una periodista y no un equity analyst) y 3. El ente regulador decide que la autoregulacion es la mejor alternativa para la industria.
En el caso de las hipotecas subprime que causo la crisis actual tiene las mismas características. Interesantemente aunque muchas personas sentían que existía una percepción errónea sobre el mercado hipotecario desde el 2005, este sistema no exploto hasta varios años después. La razón fue porque i) los jugadores estaban haciendo mucho dinero, ii) por lo que a nadie le importaba el valor real del activo, iii) no existía un ente regulador que vigilara los supuestos check and balances.
Por eso para poder estimar la siguiente crisis mundial tenemos que buscar un segmento que cumpla con las siguientes tres características:
1. Tiene que ser un segmento difícil de entender; ya sea porque el proceso es complicado, por la cultura, por la geografía, o por algo más. Si es complicado y la gente está haciendo dinero en este segmento, esto quiere decir que la mayoría de inversionistas simplemente está siguiendo la marea
2. Los jugadores en este segmento tienen que tener características y principios diferentes para que exista una desinformación de las diferentes partes. Esta característica va a ser el catalizador de la percepción errónea necesaria.
3. La percepción erronea tiene que ser sobre una parte relevante o grande para el segmento (tipo subprime, internet stocks, oil prices) se vea afectado y para que tenga un efecto domino al resto de la economía.
Mi voto va por China. Yo creo que la próxima gran recesión va a estar relacionado con China. De alguna u otra forma cumple con esos tres requisitos.
Thursday, February 11, 2010
La Confianza Como Sistema Regulador
Después de leer el artículo de Michael Lewis (The End of Wall Street) publicado Portfolio en Noviembre 2008 (y republicado en mi blog en el 2009) me quede pensando cómo muy pocas personas en Wall Street realmente saben que causo la gran recesión y se alinearon diferentes circunstancias para afectar la economía de la forma que la afecto. Inclusive me hizo pensar en el proceso de descubrimiento del valor (en inglés, price discovery process) de un activo, una acción o una deuda.
En el mundo de las finanzas existen varios mecanismos e instrumentos que le ayudan al inversionista a valorar un activo (como por el ejemplo el famoso flujo de cada descontado o DCF por sus siglas en ingles). Después de leer este articulo me di cuenta que quizás el proceso es mas subjetivo de lo que pensaba. Yo recordaba de mi época en banca de inversión que al final un DCF está compuesto de un sin número de suposiciones que pueden cambiar el valor del activo. Uno trataba de validar los resultados con otros métodos (como por ejemplo la valoración por múltiplos) por lo que se sentía que el valor final tenia no solamente lógica por el famoso DCF pero también porque era validado por otros analistas. Lo interesante es que al final la valoración está dada por 2 o 3 analistas estrellas que cubren la firma (los demás analistas simplemente son seguidores) y posiblemente si la empresa esta en una industria complicada de todos los analistas que la cubren una minoría realmente entiende que esta pasando.
Por eso en industrias complejas el famoso price discovery process no es tan sencillo como hacer un DCF porque los analistas que proveen la guía no están tan bien informados y la mayoría de jugadores involucrados en el proceso no les interesa encontrar el valor real de la acción sino solo hacer dinero. Estas circunstancias no son destructibles siempre y cuando no estemos hablando de una industria que abarque gran parte del sistema financiero de un país. Por ejemplo, si este problema lo tiene la industria de la educación postsecundaria, no es un problema tan grave. El problema de falta de entendimiento de la industria se reflejara en la volatilidad de los precios de las instituciones educativas que tranzan en el mercado.
El problema se encuentra cuando estas características se ven en una industria gigantesca o una industria que abarque otras industrias. Esto fue lo que sucedió con la crisis de los papeles subprime cuando se juntaron varias características o factores que causaron la gran recesión. Entre estos menciono algunos:
1. La complejidad del negocio (específicamente en el caso de los credit default swaps y demás derivadas de crédito utilizadas para crear liquidez en el mercado)
2. La poca sofisticación de los jugadores (aunque fuesen sofisticados en otros segmentos, este segmento era particularmente difícil de entender)
3. Los jugadores estaban mas preocupados por hacer dinero que por entender exactamente como estaban haciendo el dinero y los riesgos asociados con hacer ese tipo de dinero
4. No existía un ente o ley reguladora que ayudara a balancear los diferentes factores en el mercado y la desinformación de todos los jugadores (no solamente inversionistas pero también las personas que simplemente querían tener vivienda propia).
Esta recesión es claro ejemplo de lo que sucede cuando la confianza es la reguladora del sistema. En EEUU la confianza ha sido gran reguladora de muchos sistemas. Por ejemplo uno puedo devolver mercancía en EEUU porque todos confían que no están abusando del sistema. La confianza puede regular un sistema que no tenga jugadores con diferentes principios. En este caso se necesitaba una ley o un ente regulador. Esta es una de las razones por lo que esta crisis no se origino en otro país sino que se tuvo que generar en EEUU.
En Colombia o en América Latina, ya no existe confianza en que el sistema se autoregule. Se sabe que el jugador va a abusar del contrincante o del sistema de alguna manera posible, y si no existe esa manera se la inventa. Por eso en nuestros países la regulación tiene que venir de una manera clara y contundente para balancear los factores y crear un ambiente justo para todos los jugadores.
Sunday, January 17, 2010
Historia de Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo
El artículo es interesante porque describe como Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo pudo llegar a convertirse en el empresario mas poderoso de Colombia sin grandes recursos, palancas o conexiones.
De las enseñanzas que me deja este articulo tenemos:
1. "Trabajar, trabajar y trabajar"... si quiere hacer dinero le toca arremangarse.
2. Uno consigue los mejores oportunidades donde hay poca competencia. Ya sea hacer un acueducto en Alvarado, o comprar el peor banco del sistema financiero, o comprar con plata en mano accionista por accionista. Entre mas dificil sea el asunto menos competencia hay.
3. Sino sabe jugar ajedrez, comience a aprender. Todo es estrategia y si puedes comenzar a deducir cuales son los posibles movimientos de tu competencia tienes una ventaja competitiva.
4. Todos los negocios comienzan por los numeros pero se vuelven realidad a punta de convicción (obviamente trabajando, trabajando y trabajando).
5. "La clave de delegar es saber supervisar."
6. El bienestar familiar se impone al bienestar económico.
Aqui esta su historia completa...
http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/rey-midas/131990.aspx
Saturday, December 12, 2009
Pensamientos desde Bolivia (Por Hernan)
La semana pasada fui a ver un edificio que estaba ubicado a una hora de avión de La Paz hacia el norte (Rurrenabaque, Abel Iturralde) cerca de Brasil, y luego cruce un rio en balsa y después 8 horas en camioneta por la selva amazónica hasta llegar al edificio.
Cada día tuve que visitar un lugar distinto, muchas veces con un chofer que hable Aymará y Quechua, ya que en muchos lugares no hablan ¨el¨ castellano. Algunos de estos lugares generan mucha tristeza debido a que la pobreza es aguda. Algunos de estos pueblitos parecerían estar olvidados en la historia y a pesar de que tienen fe, yo creo que acá no llega ni su dios.
Estos viajes me permitieron no solo experimentar un calor y un sol calcínate, una selva del verde mas intenso, sino que también me pude descubrir la cultura de la Bolivia Profunda. Esta es una cultura sumamente amable, supersticiosa, y con todo el respeto, digo sufrida y sumisa. Nuestra cultura es sumamente más dominante y manipuladora.
La diferencia social, económica, cultural y educativa entre la clase campesina (indígena) y la clase alta es abismal. Parecería que es directamente proporcional el nivel educativo y económico a la amabilidad. Cuanto mayor la pobreza, mayor la gentileza.
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
Algo Hicimos Mal (Por Oscar Arias)
Trinidad y Tobago (18 de abril del 2009)
Tengo la impresión de que cada vez que los países caribeños y latinoamericanos se reúnen con el presidente de los Estados Unidos de América, es para pedirle cosas o para reclamarle cosas. Casi siempre, es para culpar a Estados Unidos de nuestros males pasados, presentes y futuros. No creo que eso sea del todo justo.
No podemos olvidar que América Latina tuvo universidades antes de que Estados Unidos creara Harvard y William & Mary, que son las primeras universidades de ese país. No podemos olvidar que en este continente, como en el mundo entero, por lo menos hasta 1750 todos los americanos eran más o menos iguales: todos eran pobres.
Cuando aparece la Revolución Industrial en Inglaterra, otros países se montan en ese vagón: Alemania, Francia, Estados Unidos, Canadá, Australia, Nueva Zelanda... y así la Revolución Industrial pasó por América Latina como un cometa, y no nos dimos cuenta. Ciertamente perdimos la oportunidad.
También hay una diferencia muy grande. Leyendo la historia de América Latina, comparada con la historia de Estados Unidos, uno comprende que Latinoamérica no tuvo un John Winthrop español, ni portugués, que viniera con la Biblia en su mano dispuesto a construir "una Ciudad sobre una Colina", una ciudad que brillara, como fue la pretensión de los peregrinos que llegaron a Estados Unidos.
Hace 50 años, México era más rico que Portugal . En 1950, un país como Brasil tenía un ingreso per cápita más elevado que el de Corea del Sur. Hace 60 años, Honduras tenía más riqueza per cápita que Singapur, y hoy Singapur -en cuestión de 35 ó 40 años- es un país con $40.000 de ingreso anual por habitante. Bueno, algo hicimos mal los latinoamericanos.
¿Qué hicimos mal? No puedo enumerar todas las cosas que hemos hecho mal. Para comenzar, tenemos una escolaridad de 7 años. Esa es la escolaridad promedio de América Latina y no es el caso de la mayoría de los países asiáticos. Ciertamente no es el caso de países como Estados Unidos y Canadá, con la mejor educación del mundo, similar a la de los europeos. De cada 10 estudiantes que ingresan a la secundaria en América Latina, en algunos países solo uno termina esa secundaria. Hay países que tienen una mortalidad infantil de 50 niños por cada mil, cuando el promedio en los países asiáticos más avanzados es de 8, 9 ó 10.
Nosotros tenemos países donde la carga tributaria es del 12% del producto interno bruto, y no es responsabilidad de nadie, excepto la nuestra, que no le cobremos dinero a la gente más rica de nuestros países. Nadie tiene la culpa de eso, excepto nosotros mismos.
En 1950, cada ciudadano norteamericano era cuatro veces más rico que un ciudadano latinoamericano. Hoy en día, un ciudadano norteamericano es 10, 15 ó 20 veces más rico que un latinoamericano. Eso no es culpa de Estados Unidos, es culpa nuestra.
En mi intervención de esta mañana, me referí a un hecho que para mí es grotesco, y que lo único que demuestra es que el sistema de valores del siglo XX, que parece ser el que estamos poniendo en práctica también en el siglo XXI, es un sistema de valores equivocado. Porque no puede ser que el mundo rico dedique 100.000 millones de dólares para aliviar la pobreza del 80% de la población del mundo -en un planeta que tiene 2.500 millones de seres humanos con un ingreso de $2 por día- y que gaste 13 veces más ($1.300.000. 000.000) en armas y soldados.
Como lo dije esta mañana, no puede ser que América Latina se gaste $50.000 millones en armas y soldados. Yo me pregunto: ¿quién es el enemigo nuestro? El enemigo nuestro, presidente Correa, de esa desigualdad que usted apunta con mucha razón, es la falta de educación; es el analfabetismo; es que no gastamos en la salud de nuestro pueblo; que no creamos la infraestructura necesaria, los caminos, las carreteras, los puertos, los aeropuertos; que no estamos dedicando los recursos necesarios para detener la degradación del medio ambiente; es la desigualdad que tenemos, que realmente nos avergüenza; es producto, entre muchas cosas, por supuesto, de que no estamos educando a nuestros hijos y a nuestras hijas.
Uno va a una universidad latinoamericana y todavía parece que estamos en los sesenta, setenta u ochenta. Parece que se nos olvidó que el 9 de noviembre de 1989 pasó algo muy importante, al caer el Muro de Berlín, y que el mundo cambió. Tenemos que aceptar que este es un mundo distinto, y en eso francamente pienso que todos los académicos, que toda la gente de pensamiento, que todos los economistas, que todos los historiadores, casi que coinciden en que el siglo XXI es el siglo de los asiáticos, no de los latinoamericanos. Y yo, lamentablemente, coincido con ellos. Porque mientras nosotros seguimos discutiendo sobre ideologías, seguimos discutiendo sobre todos los "ismos" (¿cuál es el mejor? capitalismo, socialismo, comunismo, liberalismo, neoliberalismo, socialcristianismo. ..), los asiáticos encontraron un "ismo" muy realista para el siglo XXI y el final del siglo XX, que es el pragmatismo .
Para solo citar un ejemplo, recordemos que cuando Deng Xiaoping visitó Singapur y Corea del Sur, después de haberse dado cuenta de que sus propios vecinos se estaban enriqueciendo de una manera muy acelerada, regresó a Pekín y dijo a los viejos camaradas maoístas que lo habían acompañado en la Larga Marcha: "Bueno, la verdad, queridos camaradas, es que mí no me importa si el gato es blanco o negro, lo único que me interesa es que cace ratones" . Y si hubiera estado vivo Mao, se hubiera muerto de nuevo cuando dijo que " la verdad es que enriquecerse es glorioso ". Y mientras los chinos hacen esto, y desde el 79 a hoy crecen a un 11%, 12% o 13%, y han sacado a 300 millones de habitantes de la pobreza, nosotros seguimos discutiendo sobre ideologías que tuvimos que haber enterrado hace mucho tiempo atrás.
La buena noticia es que esto lo logró Deng Xioping cuando tenía 74 años. Viendo alrededor, queridos Presidentes, no veo a nadie que esté cerca de los 74 años. Por eso solo les pido que no esperemos a cumplirlos para hacer los cambios que tenemos que hacer.
Muchas gracias.
Sunday, October 11, 2009
The End of Philosophy (By David Brooks)
By DAVID BROOKS
Socrates talked. The assumption behind his approach to philosophy, and the approaches of millions of people since, is that moral thinking is mostly a matter of reason and deliberation: Think through moral problems. Find a just principle. Apply it.
One problem with this kind of approach to morality, as Michael Gazzaniga writes in his 2008 book, “Human,” is that “it has been hard to find any correlation between moral reasoning and proactive moral behavior, such as helping other people. In fact, in most studies, none has been found.”
Today, many psychologists, cognitive scientists and even philosophers embrace a different view of morality. In this view, moral thinking is more like aesthetics. As we look around the world, we are constantly evaluating what we see. Seeing and evaluating are not two separate processes. They are linked and basically simultaneous.
As Steven Quartz of the California Institute of Technology said during a recent discussion of ethics sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation, “Our brain is computing value at every fraction of a second. Everything that we look at, we form an implicit preference. Some of those make it into our awareness; some of them remain at the level of our unconscious, but ... what our brain is for, what our brain has evolved for, is to find what is of value in our environment.”
Think of what happens when you put a new food into your mouth. You don’t have to decide if it’s disgusting. You just know. You don’t have to decide if a landscape is beautiful. You just know.
Moral judgments are like that. They are rapid intuitive decisions and involve the emotion-processing parts of the brain. Most of us make snap moral judgments about what feels fair or not, or what feels good or not. We start doing this when we are babies, before we have language. And even as adults, we often can’t explain to ourselves why something feels wrong.
In other words, reasoning comes later and is often guided by the emotions that preceded it. Or as Jonathan Haidt of the University of Virginia memorably wrote, “The emotions are, in fact, in charge of the temple of morality, and ... moral reasoning is really just a servant masquerading as a high priest.”
The question then becomes: What shapes moral emotions in the first place? The answer has long been evolution, but in recent years there’s an increasing appreciation that evolution isn’t just about competition. It’s also about cooperation within groups. Like bees, humans have long lived or died based on their ability to divide labor, help each other and stand together in the face of common threats. Many of our moral emotions and intuitions reflect that history. We don’t just care about our individual rights, or even the rights of other individuals. We also care about loyalty, respect, traditions, religions. We are all the descendents of successful cooperators.
The first nice thing about this evolutionary approach to morality is that it emphasizes the social nature of moral intuition. People are not discrete units coolly formulating moral arguments. They link themselves together into communities and networks of mutual influence.
The second nice thing is that it entails a warmer view of human nature. Evolution is always about competition, but for humans, as Darwin speculated, competition among groups has turned us into pretty cooperative, empathetic and altruistic creatures — at least within our families, groups and sometimes nations.
The third nice thing is that it explains the haphazard way most of us lead our lives without destroying dignity and choice. Moral intuitions have primacy, Haidt argues, but they are not dictators. There are times, often the most important moments in our lives, when in fact we do use reason to override moral intuitions, and often those reasons — along with new intuitions — come from our friends.
The rise and now dominance of this emotional approach to morality is an epochal change. It challenges all sorts of traditions. It challenges the bookish way philosophy is conceived by most people. It challenges the Talmudic tradition, with its hyper-rational scrutiny of texts. It challenges the new atheists, who see themselves involved in a war of reason against faith and who have an unwarranted faith in the power of pure reason and in the purity of their own reasoning.
Finally, it should also challenge the very scientists who study morality. They’re good at explaining how people make judgments about harm and fairness, but they still struggle to explain the feelings of awe, transcendence, patriotism, joy and self-sacrifice, which are not ancillary to most people’s moral experiences, but central. The evolutionary approach also leads many scientists to neglect the concept of individual responsibility and makes it hard for them to appreciate that most people struggle toward goodness, not as a means, but as an end in itself.
Friday, September 11, 2009
How the Internet Got its Rules (By Stephen Crocker)
Bethesda, Md.
TODAY is an important date in the history of the Internet: the 40th anniversary of what is known as the Request for Comments. Outside the technical community, not many people know about the R.F.C.’s, but these humble documents shape the Internet’s inner workings and have played a significant role in its success.
When the R.F.C.’s were born, there wasn’t a World Wide Web. Even by the end of 1969, there was just a rudimentary network linking four computers at four research centers: the University of California, Los Angeles; the Stanford Research Institute; the University of California, Santa Barbara; and the University of Utah in Salt Lake City. The government financed the network and the hundred or fewer computer scientists who used it. It was such a small community that we all got to know one another.
A great deal of deliberation and planning had gone into the network’s underlying technology, but no one had given a lot of thought to what we would actually do with it. So, in August 1968, a handful of graduate students and staff members from the four sites began meeting intermittently, in person, to try to figure it out. (I was lucky enough to be one of the U.C.L.A. students included in these wide-ranging discussions.) It wasn’t until the next spring that we realized we should start writing down our thoughts. We thought maybe we’d put together a few temporary, informal memos on network protocols, the rules by which computers exchange information. I offered to organize our early notes.
What was supposed to be a simple chore turned out to be a nerve-racking project. Our intent was only to encourage others to chime in, but I worried we might sound as though we were making official decisions or asserting authority. In my mind, I was inciting the wrath of some prestigious professor at some phantom East Coast establishment. I was actually losing sleep over the whole thing, and when I finally tackled my first memo, which dealt with basic communication between two computers, it was in the wee hours of the morning. I had to work in a bathroom so as not to disturb the friends I was staying with, who were all asleep.
Still fearful of sounding presumptuous, I labeled the note a “Request for Comments.” R.F.C. 1, written 40 years ago today, left many questions unanswered, and soon became obsolete. But the R.F.C.’s themselves took root and flourished. They became the formal method of publishing Internet protocol standards, and today there are more than 5,000, all readily available online.
But we started writing these notes before we had e-mail, or even before the network was really working, so we wrote our visions for the future on paper and sent them around via the postal service. We’d mail each research group one printout and they’d have to photocopy more themselves.
The early R.F.C.’s ranged from grand visions to mundane details, although the latter quickly became the most common. Less important than the content of those first documents was that they were available free of charge and anyone could write one. Instead of authority-based decision-making, we relied on a process we called “rough consensus and running code.” Everyone was welcome to propose ideas, and if enough people liked it and used it, the design became a standard.
After all, everyone understood there was a practical value in choosing to do the same task in the same way. For example, if we wanted to move a file from one machine to another, and if you were to design the process one way, and I was to design it another, then anyone who wanted to talk to both of us would have to employ two distinct ways of doing the same thing. So there was plenty of natural pressure to avoid such hassles. It probably helped that in those days we avoided patents and other restrictions; without any financial incentive to control the protocols, it was much easier to reach agreement.
This was the ultimate in openness in technical design and that culture of open processes was essential in enabling the Internet to grow and evolve as spectacularly as it has. In fact, we probably wouldn’t have the Web without it. When CERN physicists wanted to publish a lot of information in a way that people could easily get to it and add to it, they simply built and tested their ideas. Because of the groundwork we’d laid in the R.F.C.’s, they did not have to ask permission, or make any changes to the core operations of the Internet. Others soon copied them — hundreds of thousands of computer users, then hundreds of millions, creating and sharing content and technology. That’s the Web.
Put another way, we always tried to design each new protocol to be both useful in its own right and a building block available to others. We did not think of protocols as finished products, and we deliberately exposed the internal architecture to make it easy for others to gain a foothold. This was the antithesis of the attitude of the old telephone networks, which actively discouraged any additions or uses they had not sanctioned.
Of course, the process for both publishing ideas and for choosing standards eventually became more formal. Our loose, unnamed meetings grew larger and semi-organized into what we called the Network Working Group. In the four decades since, that group evolved and transformed a couple of times and is now the Internet Engineering Task Force. It has some hierarchy and formality but not much, and it remains free and accessible to anyone.
The R.F.C.’s have grown up, too. They really aren’t requests for comments anymore because they are published only after a lot of vetting. But the culture that was built up in the beginning has continued to play a strong role in keeping things more open than they might have been. Ideas are accepted and sorted on their merits, with as many ideas rejected by peers as are accepted.
As we rebuild our economy, I do hope we keep in mind the value of openness, especially in industries that have rarely had it. Whether it’s in health care reform or energy innovation, the largest payoffs will come not from what the stimulus package pays for directly, but from the huge vistas we open up for others to explore.
I was reminded of the power and vitality of the R.F.C.’s when I made my first trip to Bangalore, India, 15 years ago. I was invited to give a talk at the Indian Institute of Science, and as part of the visit I was introduced to a student who had built a fairly complex software system. Impressed, I asked where he had learned to do so much. He simply said, “I downloaded the R.F.C.’s and read them.”
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
The End of Wall Street (By Michael Lewis) 7/7
[In the next 7 postings I'm going to publish an article from Michael Lewis in Nov 11, 2008 in Portfolio.com]
On July 19, 2007, the same day that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke told the U.S. Senate that he anticipated as much as $100 billion in losses in the subprime-mortgage market, FrontPoint did something unusual: It hosted its own conference call. It had had calls with its tiny population of investors, but this time FrontPoint opened it up. Steve Eisman had become a poorly kept secret. Five hundred people called in to hear what he had to say, and another 500 logged on afterward to listen to a recording of it. He explained the strange alchemy of the C.D.O. and said that he expected losses of up to $300 billion from this sliver of the market alone. To evaluate the situation, he urged his audience to “just throw your model in the garbage can. The models are all backward-looking.
The models don’t have any idea of what this world has become…. For the first time in their lives, people in the asset-backed-securitization world are actually having to think.” He explained that the rating agencies were morally bankrupt and living in fear of becoming actually bankrupt. “The rating agencies are scared to death,” he said. “They’re scared to death about doing nothing because they’ll look like fools if they do nothing.”
On September 18, 2008, Danny Moses came to work as usual at 6:30 a.m. Earlier that week, Lehman Brothers had filed for bankruptcy. The day before, the Dow had fallen 449 points to its lowest level in four years. Overnight, European governments announced a ban on short-selling, but that served as faint warning for what happened next.
At the market opening in the U.S., everything—every financial asset—went into free fall. “All hell was breaking loose in a way I had never seen in my career,” Moses says. FrontPoint was net short the market, so this total collapse should have given Moses pleasure. He might have been forgiven if he stood up and cheered. After all, he’d been betting for two years that this sort of thing could happen, and now it was, more dramatically than he had ever imagined. Instead, he felt this terrifying shudder run through him. He had maybe 100 trades on, and he worked hard to keep a handle on them all. “I spent my morning trying to control all this energy and all this information,” he says, “and I lost control. I looked at the screens. I was staring into the abyss. The end. I felt this shooting pain in my head. I don’t get headaches. At first, I thought I was having an aneurysm.”
Moses stood up, wobbled, then turned to Daniel and said, “I gotta leave. Get out of here. Now.” Daniel thought about calling an ambulance but instead took Moses out for a walk.
Outside it was gorgeous, the blue sky reaching down through the tall buildings and warming the soul. Eisman was at a Goldman Sachs conference for hedge fund managers, raising capital. Moses and Daniel got him on the phone, and he left the conference and met them on the steps of St. Patrick’s Cathedral. “We just sat there,” Moses says. “Watching the people pass.”
This was what they had been waiting for: total collapse. “The investment-banking industry is fucked,” Eisman had told me a few weeks earlier. “These guys are only beginning to understand how fucked they are. It’s like being a Scholastic, prior to Newton. Newton comes along, and one morning you wake up: ‘Holy shit, I’m wrong!’ ” Now Lehman Brothers had vanished, Merrill had surrendered, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were just a week away from ceasing to be investment banks. The investment banks were not just fucked; they were extinct.
Not so for hedge fund managers who had seen it coming. “As we sat there, we were weirdly calm,” Moses says. “We felt insulated from the whole market reality. It was an out-of-body experience. We just sat and watched the people pass and talked about what might happen next. How many of these people were going to lose their jobs. Who was going to rent these buildings after all the Wall Street firms collapsed.” Eisman was appalled. “Look,” he said. “I’m short. I don’t want the country to go into a depression. I just want it to fucking deleverage.” He had tried a thousand times in a thousand ways to explain how screwed up the business was, and no one wanted to hear it. “That Wall Street has gone down because of this is justice,” he says. “They fucked people. They built a castle to rip people off. Not once in all these years have I come across a person inside a big Wall Street firm who was having a crisis of conscience.”
Truth to tell, there wasn’t a whole lot of hand-wringing inside FrontPoint either. The only one among them who wrestled a bit with his conscience was Daniel. “Vinny, being from Queens, needs to see the dark side of everything,” Eisman says. To which Daniel replies, “The way we thought about it was, ‘By shorting this market we’re creating the liquidity to keep the market going.’ ”
“It was like feeding the monster,” Eisman says of the market for subprime bonds. “We fed the monster until it blew up.”
About the time they were sitting on the steps of the midtown cathedral, I sat in a booth in a restaurant on the East Side, waiting for John Gutfreund to arrive for lunch, and wondered, among other things, why any restaurant would seat side by side two men without the slightest interest in touching each other.
There was an umbilical cord running from the belly of the exploded beast back to the financial 1980s. A friend of mine created the first mortgage derivative in 1986, a year after we left the Salomon Brothers trading program. (“The problem isn’t the tools,” he likes to say. “It’s who is using the tools. Derivatives are like guns.”)
When I published my book, the 1980s were supposed to be ending. I received a lot of undeserved credit for my timing. The social disruption caused by the collapse of the savings-and-loan industry and the rise of hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts had given way to a brief period of recriminations. Just as most students at Ohio State read Liar’s Poker as a manual, most TV and radio interviewers regarded me as a whistleblower. (The big exception was Geraldo Rivera. He put me on a show called “People Who Succeed Too Early in Life” along with some child actors who’d gone on to become drug addicts.) Anti-Wall Street feeling ran high—high enough for Rudy Giuliani to float a political career on it—but the result felt more like a witch hunt than an honest reappraisal of the financial order. The public lynchings of Gutfreund and junk-bond king Michael Milken were excuses not to deal with the disturbing forces underpinning their rise. Ditto the cleaning up of Wall Street’s trading culture. The surface rippled, but down below, in the depths, the bonus pool remained undisturbed. Wall Street firms would soon be frowning upon profanity, firing traders for so much as glancing at a stripper, and forcing male employees to treat women almost as equals. Lehman Brothers circa 2008 more closely resembled a normal corporation with solid American values than did any Wall Street firm circa 1985
The changes were camouflage. They helped distract outsiders from the truly profane event: the growing misalignment of interests between the people who trafficked in financial risk and the wider culture.
I’d not seen Gutfreund since I quit Wall Street. I’d met him, nervously, a couple of times on the trading floor. A few months before I left, my bosses asked me to explain to Gutfreund what at the time seemed like exotic trades in derivatives I’d done with a European hedge fund. I tried. He claimed not to be smart enough to understand any of it, and I assumed that was how a Wall Street C.E.O. showed he was the boss, by rising above the details. There was no reason for him to remember any of these encounters, and he didn’t: When my book came out and became a public-relations nuisance to him, he told reporters we’d never met.
Over the years, I’d heard bits and pieces about Gutfreund. I knew that after he’d been forced to resign from Salomon Brothers he’d fallen on harder times. I heard later that a few years ago he’d sat on a panel about Wall Street at Columbia Business School. When his turn came to speak, he advised students to find something more meaningful to do with their lives. As he began to describe his career, he broke down and wept.
When I emailed him to invite him to lunch, he could not have been more polite or more gracious. That attitude persisted as he was escorted to the table, made chitchat with the owner, and ordered his food. He’d lost a half-step and was more deliberate in his movements, but otherwise he was completely recognizable. The same veneer of denatured courtliness masked the same animal need to see the world as it was, rather than as it should be.
We spent 20 minutes or so determining that our presence at the same lunch table was not going to cause the earth to explode. We discovered we had a mutual acquaintance in New Orleans. We agreed that the Wall Street C.E.O. had no real ability to keep track of the frantic innovation occurring inside his firm. (“I didn’t understand all the product lines, and they don’t either,” he said.) We agreed, further, that the chief of the Wall Street investment bank had little control over his subordinates. (“They’re buttering you up and then doing whatever the fuck they want to do.”) He thought the cause of the financial crisis was “simple. Greed on both sides—greed of investors and the greed of the bankers.” I thought it was more complicated. Greed on Wall Street was a given—almost an obligation. The problem was the system of incentives that channeled the greed.
But I didn’t argue with him. For just as you revert to being about nine years old when you visit your parents, you revert to total subordination when you are in the presence of your former C.E.O. John Gutfreund was still the King of Wall Street, and I was still a geek. He spoke in declarative statements; I spoke in questions.
But as he spoke, my eyes kept drifting to his hands. His alarmingly thick and meaty hands. They weren’t the hands of a soft Wall Street banker but of a boxer. I looked up. The boxer was smiling—though it was less a smile than a placeholder expression. And he was saying, very deliberately, “Your…fucking…book.”
I smiled back, though it wasn’t quite a smile.
“Your fucking book destroyed my career, and it made yours,” he said.
I didn’t think of it that way and said so, sort of.
“Why did you ask me to lunch?” he asked, though pleasantly. He was genuinely curious.
You can’t really tell someone that you asked him to lunch to let him know that you don’t think of him as evil. Nor can you tell him that you asked him to lunch because you thought that you could trace the biggest financial crisis in the history of the world back to a decision he had made. John Gutfreund did violence to the Wall Street social order—and got himself dubbed the King of Wall Street—when he turned Salomon Brothers from a private partnership into Wall Street’s first public corporation. He ignored the outrage of Salomon’s retired partners. (“I was disgusted by his materialism,” William Salomon, the son of the firm’s founder, who had made Gutfreund C.E.O. only after he’d promised never to sell the firm, had told me.) He lifted a giant middle finger at the moral disapproval of his fellow Wall Street C.E.O.’s. And he seized the day. He and the other partners not only made a quick killing; they transferred the ultimate financial risk from themselves to their shareholders. It didn’t, in the end, make a great deal of sense for the shareholders. (A share of Salomon Brothers purchased when I arrived on the trading floor, in 1986, at a then market price of $42, would be worth 2.26 shares of Citigroup today—market value: $27.) But it made fantastic sense for the investment bankers.
From that moment, though, the Wall Street firm became a black box. The shareholders who financed the risks had no real understanding of what the risk takers were doing, and as the risk-taking grew ever more complex, their understanding diminished. The moment Salomon Brothers demonstrated the potential gains to be had by the investment bank as public corporation, the psychological foundations of Wall Street shifted from trust to blind faith.
No investment bank owned by its employees would have levered itself 35 to 1 or bought and held $50 billion in mezzanine C.D.O.’s. I doubt any partnership would have sought to game the rating agencies or leap into bed with loan sharks or even allow mezzanine C.D.O.’s to be sold to its customers. The hoped-for short-term gain would not have justified the long-term hit.
No partnership, for that matter, would have hired me or anyone remotely like me. Was there ever any correlation between the ability to get in and out of Princeton and a talent for taking financial risk?
Now I asked Gutfreund about his biggest decision. “Yes,” he said. “They—the heads of the other Wall Street firms—all said what an awful thing it was to go public and how could you do such a thing. But when the temptation arose, they all gave in to it.” He agreed that the main effect of turning a partnership into a corporation was to transfer the financial risk to the shareholders. “When things go wrong, it’s their problem,” he said—and obviously not theirs alone. When a Wall Street investment bank screwed up badly enough, its risks became the problem of the U.S. government. “It’s laissez-faire until you get in deep shit,” he said, with a half chuckle. He was out of the game.
It was now all someone else’s fault.
He watched me curiously as I scribbled down his words. “What’s this for?” he asked.
I told him I thought it might be worth revisiting the world I’d described in Liar’s Poker, now that it was finally dying. Maybe bring out a 20th-anniversary edition.
“That’s nauseating,” he said.
Hard as it was for him to enjoy my company, it was harder for me not to enjoy his. He was still tough, as straight and blunt as a butcher. He’d helped create a monster, but he still had in him a lot of the old Wall Street, where people said things like “A man’s word is his bond.” On that Wall Street, people didn’t walk out of their firms and cause trouble for their former bosses by writing books about them. “No,” he said, “I think we can agree about this: Your fucking book destroyed my career, and it made yours.” With that, the former king of a former Wall Street lifted the plate that held his appetizer and asked sweetly, “Would you like a deviled egg?”
Until that moment, I hadn’t paid much attention to what he’d been eating. Now I saw he’d ordered the best thing in the house, this gorgeous frothy confection of an earlier age. Who ever dreamed up the deviled egg? Who knew that a simple egg could be made so complicated and yet so appealing? I reached over and took one. Something for nothing. It never loses its charm
Saturday, July 11, 2009
The End of Wall Street (By Michael Lewis) 6/7
[In the next 7 postings I'm going to publish an article from Michael Lewis in Nov 11, 2008 in Portfolio.com]
Eisman, Daniel, and Moses then flew out to Las Vegas for an even bigger subprime conference. By now, Eisman knew everything he needed to know about the quality of the loans being made. He still didn’t fully understand how the apparatus worked, but he knew that Wall Street had built a doomsday machine. He was at once opportunistic and outraged.
Their first stop was a speech given by the C.E.O. of Option One, the mortgage originator owned by H&R Block. When the guy got to the part of his speech about Option One’s subprime-loan portfolio, he claimed to be expecting a modest default rate of 5 percent. Eisman raised his hand. Moses and Daniel sank into their chairs. “It wasn’t a Q&A,” says Moses. “The guy was giving a speech. He sees Steve’s hand and says, ‘Yes?’”
“Would you say that 5 percent is a probability or a possibility?” Eisman asked.
A probability, said the C.E.O., and he continued his speech.
Eisman had his hand up in the air again, waving it around. Oh, no, Moses thought. “The one thing Steve always says,” Daniel explains, “is you must assume they are lying to you. They will always lie to you.” Moses and Daniel both knew what Eisman thought of these subprime lenders but didn’t see the need for him to express it here in this manner. For Eisman wasn’t raising his hand to ask a question. He had his thumb and index finger in a big circle. He was using his fingers to speak on his behalf. Zero! they said.
“Yes?” the C.E.O. said, obviously irritated. “Is that another question?”
“No,” said Eisman. “It’s a zero. There is zero probability that your default rate will be 5 percent.” The losses on subprime loans would be much, much greater. Before the guy could reply, Eisman’s cell phone rang. Instead of shutting it off, Eisman reached into his pocket and answered it. “Excuse me,” he said, standing up. “But I need to take this call.” And with that, he walked out.
Eisman’s willingness to be abrasive in order to get to the heart of the matter was obvious to all; what was harder to see was his credulity: He actually wanted to believe in the system. As quick as he was to cry bullshit when he saw it, he was still shocked by bad behavior. That night in Vegas, he was seated at dinner beside a really nice guy who invested in mortgage C.D.O.’s—collateralized debt obligations. By then, Eisman thought he knew what he needed to know about C.D.O.’s. He didn’t, it turned out.
Later, when I sit down with Eisman, the very first thing he wants to explain is the importance of the mezzanine C.D.O. What you notice first about Eisman is his lips. He holds them pursed, waiting to speak. The second thing you notice is his short, light hair, cropped in a manner that suggests he cut it himself while thinking about something else. “You have to understand this,” he says. “This was the engine of doom.” Then he draws a picture of several towers of debt. The first tower is made of the original subprime loans that had been piled together. At the top of this tower is the AAA tranche, just below it the AA tranche, and so on down to the riskiest, the BBB tranche—the bonds Eisman had shorted. But Wall Street had used these BBB tranches—the worst of the worst—to build yet another tower of bonds: a “particularly egregious” C.D.O. The reason they did this was that the rating agencies, presented with the pile of bonds backed by dubious loans, would pronounce most of them AAA. These bonds could then be sold to investors—pension funds, insurance companies—who were allowed to invest only in highly rated securities. “I cannot fucking believe this is allowed—I must have said that a thousand times in the past two years,” Eisman says.
His dinner companion in Las Vegas ran a fund of about $15 billion and managed C.D.O.’s backed by the BBB tranche of a mortgage bond, or as Eisman puts it, “the equivalent of three levels of dog shit lower than the original bonds.”
FrontPoint had spent a lot of time digging around in the dog shit and knew that the default rates were already sufficient to wipe out this guy’s entire portfolio. “God, you must be having a hard time,” Eisman told his dinner companion.
“No,” the guy said, “I’ve sold everything out.”
After taking a fee, he passed them on to other investors. His job was to be the C.D.O. “expert,” but he actually didn’t spend any time at all thinking about what was in the C.D.O.’s. “He managed the C.D.O.’s,” says Eisman, “but managed what? I was just appalled. People would pay up to have someone manage their C.D.O.’s—as if this moron was helping you. I thought, You prick, you don’t give a fuck about the investors in this thing
Whatever rising anger Eisman felt was offset by the man’s genial disposition. Not only did he not mind that Eisman took a dim view of his C.D.O.’s; he saw it as a basis for friendship. “Then he said something that blew my mind,” Eisman tells me. “He says, ‘I love guys like you who short my market. Without you, I don’t have anything to buy.’ ”
That’s when Eisman finally got it. Here he’d been making these side bets with Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank on the fate of the BBB tranche without fully understanding why those firms were so eager to make the bets. Now he saw. There weren’t enough Americans with shitty credit taking out loans to satisfy investors’ appetite for the end product. The firms used Eisman’s bet to synthesize more of them. Here, then, was the difference between fantasy finance and fantasy football: When a fantasy player drafts Peyton Manning, he doesn’t create a second Peyton Manning to inflate the league’s stats. But when Eisman bought a credit-default swap, he enabled Deutsche Bank to create another bond identical in every respect but one to the original. The only difference was that there was no actual homebuyer or borrower. The only assets backing the bonds were the side bets Eisman and others made with firms like Goldman Sachs. Eisman, in effect, was paying to Goldman the interest on a subprime mortgage. In fact, there was no mortgage at all. “They weren’t satisfied getting lots of unqualified borrowers to borrow money to buy a house they couldn’t afford,” Eisman says. “They were creating them out of whole cloth. One hundred times over! That’s why the losses are so much greater than the loans. But that’s when I realized they needed us to keep the machine running. I was like, This is allowed?”
This particular dinner was hosted by Deutsche Bank, whose head trader, Greg Lippman, was the fellow who had introduced Eisman to the subprime bond market. Eisman went and found Lippman, pointed back to his own dinner companion, and said, “I want to short him.” Lippman thought he was joking; he wasn’t. “Greg, I want to short his paper,” Eisman repeated. “Sight unseen.”
Eisman started out running a $60 million equity fund but was now short around $600 million of various subprime-related securities. In the spring of 2007, the market strengthened. But, says Eisman, “credit quality always gets better in March and April. And the reason it always gets better in March and April is that people get their tax refunds. You would think people in the securitization world would know this. We just thought that was moronic.”
He was already short the stocks of mortgage originators and the homebuilders. Now he took short positions in the rating agencies—“they were making 10 times more rating C.D.O.’s than they were rating G.M. bonds, and it was all going to end”—and, finally, the biggest Wall Street firms because of their exposure to C.D.O.’s. He wasn’t allowed to short Morgan Stanley because it owned a stake in his fund. But he shorted UBS, Lehman Brothers, and a few others. Not long after that, FrontPoint had a visit from Sanford C. Bernstein’s Brad Hintz, a prominent analyst who covered Wall Street firms. Hintz wanted to know what Eisman was up to. “We just shorted Merrill Lynch,” Eisman told him.
“Why?” asked Hintz.
“We have a simple thesis,” Eisman explained. “There is going to be a calamity, and whenever there is a calamity, Merrill is there.” When it came time to bankrupt Orange County with bad advice, Merrill was there. When the internet went bust, Merrill was there. Way back in the 1980s, when the first bond trader was let off his leash and lost hundreds of millions of dollars, Merrill was there to take the hit. That was Eisman’s logic—the logic of Wall Street’s pecking order. Goldman Sachs was the big kid who ran the games in this neighborhood. Merrill Lynch was the little fat kid assigned the least pleasant roles, just happy to be a part of things. The game, as Eisman saw it, was Crack the Whip. He assumed Merrill Lynch had taken its assigned place at the end of the chain.
There was only one thing that bothered Eisman, and it continued to trouble him as late as May 2007. “The thing we couldn’t figure out is: It’s so obvious. Why hasn’t everyone else figured out that the machine is done?” Eisman had long subscribed to Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, a newsletter famous in Wall Street circles and obscure outside them. Jim Grant, its editor, had been prophesying doom ever since the great debt cycle began, in the mid-1980s. In late 2006, he decided to investigate these things called C.D.O.’s. Or rather, he had asked his young assistant, Dan Gertner, a chemical engineer with an M.B.A., to see if he could understand them. Gertner went off with the documents that purported to explain C.D.O.’s to potential investors and for several days sweated and groaned and heaved and suffered. “Then he came back,” says Grant, “and said, ‘I can’t figure this thing out.’ And I said, ‘I think we have our story.
Eisman read Grant’s piece as independent confirmation of what he knew in his bones about the C.D.O.’s he had shorted. “When I read it, I thought, Oh my God. This is like owning a gold mine. When I read that, I was the only guy in the equity world who almost had an orgasm.”